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Legal Notes
Harold Dudley Greeley, Editor
SHERMAN ACT

In 1890 congress enacted the Sherman anti-trust law which made combina
tions or monopolies in restraint of trade criminal offenses. This applies only
to interstate commerce because congress has no power to legislate concerning
trade which is confined within the territorial limits of a single state. The courts
have construed the Sherman act to cover only unreasonable restraint and the
test of reasonableness seems to be this: The restraint is reasonable if it merely
furnishes reasonable protection to the contracting parties and does not jeopard
ize any interest of the public. Public-utility corporations can not combine and
divide the territory to be served and thus avoid competition. Monopolies in
public necessaries such as coal are illegal.
For many years prior to our present crisis business men have complained of
the practical uncertainty in the administration of this statute. They have
hesitated to engage in an economically sound venture when they ran the risk of
going to jail years later if some jury or court somewhere should decide that their
combination had been unreasonable. Economists and other students of public
affairs have frankly questioned the wisdom of encouraging competition which
was certain to leave only the strongest surviving and to impose on them a wholly
unnecessary cost. Men in charge of trade associations and cost-finding groups
have proceeded with caution. But none of this opposition has been effective,
probably because the pain of a new idea and the inertia of a comfortably well-off
majority naturally nurtured a policy of laissez-faire.
Now that the crisis is here, with its obvious over-production or under-con
sumption and its unbelievably low commodity prices, some change is imminent.
Whether the Sherman act will go the way of a well-known amendment to the
constitution, whether administrative laxity in enforcement will be encouraged,
whether some governmental agency will be empowered to approve plans in
advance, no one can say. But the latest decision of the United States supreme
court is distinctly liberal and, as far as industries dealing in natural resources
are affected, perhaps no legislative change will be needed.
In Appalachian Coals, Inc., et al. v. United States, 77 U. S. (L. Ed.) 623, the
supreme court, with one judge dissenting, found no illegal restraint of trade in
the following situation: one hundred thirty-seven producers of coal in Virginia,
West Virginia, Kentucky and Tennessee formed a joint selling agency which
was named Appalachian Coals, Inc. These producers controlled 73 per cent.
of the commercial production in their territory and one inevitable result will be
the elimination of competition among themselves. But the court held that as
they were seeking fairly to improve conditions in their industry and as it would
be impossible for them to fix selling prices because of the supply of coal obtain
able elsewhere, there was no such unreasonable restraint as would violate the
Sherman act. The fact that correction of abuses may tend to stabilize a busi
ness or to produce fairer price levels does not mean that a cooperative effort to
correct them necessarily constitutes an unlawful restraint of trade. The intel-
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ligent conduct of business through the acquisition of full information about all
relevant facts may legally be sought by cooperation. Putting an end to
injurious practices and improving the competitive position of a group of pro
ducers may be entirely consonant with the public interest where the group must
still meet effective competition in a fair market and where the group neither
seeks nor is able to effect control of selling prices. But the court retained
jurisdiction over the matter in order that it might act promptly if occasion
arose in the future to prevent violation of the Sherman act.
OBLIGATIONS OF POLITICAL COMMITTEES

After election comes the task of collecting for campaign supplies and services
furnished on credit. When an accountant is called upon to render technical
service on behalf of this or that candidate or that or this movement, he should
decide first whether or not he will do so gratuitously as a contribution to a cause
in which he believes. If his decision is in the negative, he then should make
certain that there can be no misunderstanding as to who is to pay for his work
and he should retain an attorney to prepare the agreements necessary to protect
the rights of everyone concerned. Two recent decisions in New York em
phasize the importance of this. In Empire City Job Printing Co. v. Harbord,
89 N. Y. Law Journal 1729, the plaintiff furnished two shipments of muslin
banners to a political committee. The court decided that the members of such
a committee were not individually liable on contracts made in the name of the
committee unless they expressly or by implication pledged their individual
credit. A political committee by its very nature is transitory. “When the
agency is disclosed and the contract relates to the matter of the agency and is
within the authority conferred, the agent will not be personally bound, unless
upon clear and explicit evidence of an intention to substitute or to superadd his
personal liability for, or to, that of the principal.” In President, etc. v. Koenig,
89 N. Y. Law Journal 1985, an action was brought upon a promissory note
signed with the full name of a political committee by the name of its president,
in an attempt to hold the president personally. It was decided that no member
could be held personally unless the president who signed the note had the
authority to pledge individual credits of members. The status of the members
of the committee was that of members of an unincorporated association. In an
association of that sort formed for pecuniary gain, the members may be held as
partners, but in one organized for political, social or benevolent purposes it
will not be presumed or implied that an officer contracting a debt for the associa
tion had authority to bind the members individually.
NEED FOR STANDARDIZATION

The need for standardization and organization was strikingly illustrated
upon the recent death of an official court reporter in Ontario, Canada. This
reporter wrote a unique system of shorthand which no one else was able to read.
After reporting the testimony in several trials, he died before he had transcribed
his shorthand notes and no one able to decipher them could be found. In two
of these cases, one of the parties desired to appeal but it was impossible to
obtain a transcript of the testimony for use on appeal. The court of appeal
ordered a new trial in each case. The parties were not restricted to the evi-
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dence given at the former trials but were permitted to begin anew. Patton et
al. v. Yukon Consolidated Gold Co., Ltd., et al., 1933 O. W. N. No. 8, p. 154;
Olanow v. The Goderich Mfg. Co., Ltd., et al., 1933 O. W. N. No. 10, p. 183.
Apart from the delay and the matter of the cost to the parties and to the
government, this procedure resulted in giving each party to the litigation a
complete examination of the other party before trial. This may or may not
have been conducive to the attainment of justice. If an accountant on the
staff of a firm wrote a unique system of long-hand which no one else could read
and made his working papers in a way which no one else could understand and
then died before he had prepared his report, the consequences might well be
fully as serious as those in the Canadian litigations.
AUTHORITY OF CORPORATION’S SECRETARY

In Nathan v. Regent Laundry Service, Inc., 89 N. Y. Law Journal 1521, the
court held that the secretary of a corporation was a general officer with appar
ent authority to do any act which the board of directors legally could authorize
or ratify. Thus a contract of employment executed by him as secretary
bound the corporation, despite the fact that the corporation’s by-laws provided
that the secretary was a ministerial officer whose duties were limited strictly to
the performance of such work as was merely secretarial in character. Such
a by-law has no force as a limitation of authority against an outside person
when the secretary performs an act within the apparent scope of a secretary’s
authority.
ENGAGEMENT RINGS

Accountants who in their cool, calm and collected manner contemplate
matrimony should be apprised of a latent right. The appellate division of the
supreme court of New York has just decided that a woman may not retain
an engagement ring when she declines without cause to keep her promise to
wed the donor. Beck v. Cohen, 262 N. Y. S. 716. In this case the ring cost
$350, but the report does not show whether it had been paid for or the jilted
man was to have a reminder of his romance whenever an instalment fell due.
The court in its learned search for legal truth went back only to the year 1576.
Two of the five judges dissented. On a rising diamond market the fair one
might be justified in reimbursing the wooer for his cash outlay and keeping the
profit. If the engagement were a long one, interest on the investment should
be claimed as an element of cost.
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